We examine the strategies of …rms that face an array of organizational choices. Each …rm must acquire intermediate inputs and assemble …nal products. It can perform these activities internally or externally, and at home or abroad. We study the relative prevalence of various organizational structures in industries that di¤er in …xed organizational costs when …rms in each industry di¤er in their productivity levels. We identify conditions under which outsourcing and foreign sourcing are positively correlated across industries. This correlation results from two sources of complementarity between outsourcing and foreign sourcing.
Introduction
Outsourcing has been growing both domestically and internationally. So has foreign direct investment (FDI). New models of international trade address these phenomena using recent advances in the economic theory of organizations. The models help us to identify circumstances under which …rms choose to make their inputs themselves or buy them from third parties, and when they choose to produce or procure their inputs locally or abroad. 1 Some authors investigate the organizational choices of homogeneous …rms in an industry with some particular characteristics while others examine the relative prevalence of di¤erent organizational structures in industries with heterogeneous …rms. 2 In this paper, we combine elements from Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2004) to study the relationship between outsourcing and foreign sourcing (or "o¤shoring"). Our analysis focuses on industries with heterogeneous …rms that make intensive use of intermediate inputs. Contracting problems limit the types of contracts that can be written between …nal producers and input suppliers. Intermediate inputs can be produced domestically or in a low-wage country, and can be produced in house or outsourced.
By assumption, assembly of …nal goods takes place within the boundaries of the …rm that has developed the product, but we sometimes allow this activity to be performed abroad.
First, we assume that assembly takes place at home and that intermediate goods can be transported at no cost. We identify conditions under which cross-industry variation in the …xed cost of outsourcing generates a positive correlation between outsourcing and foreign sourcing. We then introduce transport costs for intermediate inputs and allow …rms to choose where to assemble their …nal output. In this case, cross-industry variation in the …xed cost of doing business abroad produces a second complementarity between outsourcing and foreign sourcing. The latter …nding is in keeping with conditions described in a recent article in the Financial Times about problems facing …rms producing in China. 3 Companies that cannot …nd e¢ cient local sources for components in China are burdened with the extra costs of shipping inputs from home. Apparently, FDI often goes hand in hand with the ability to …nd suitable Chinese suppliers. The trade-o¤s between in house production and outsourcing and between shipping intermediate goods and producing them in proximity to assembly operations are the subject of our investigation below.
Our model combines elements from Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2004) . There are two countries, North and South, and one factor of production, labor. The wage rate is w N in the North and w S in the South, with w N > w S . We normalize prices so that w N = 1.
Consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences for di¤erentiated products which generate the inverse demand function p j (i) = D j x j (i) (1 ) for variety i of good j, where p j (i) is the price of this variety, x j (i) is the quantity demanded, D j is an index of total demand for the output of industry j, and is a parameter that determines the elasticity of demand. We assume 0 < < 1, so that the elasticity of demand is larger than one. All …nal goods are freely traded with zero transport costs. Thus, prices of …nal goods are the same in both countries and D j measures world demand for the output of industry j.
Entrepreneurs are located in the North. To enter a market and produce any variety, an entrepreneur …rst must incur a …xed cost of f E units of Northern labor. An entrant then draws a productivity level from a cumulative distribution G( ). Having learned , the entrepreneur decides whether and how to produce …nal goods or whether to exit the market.
Production requires two inputs, assembly a j (i) and intermediate inputs m j (i). 4 These inputs must be specialized to variety i of product j; otherwise, they cannot be combined to produce …nal output. Output from specialized inputs is given by In what follows, we focus on a particular industry j and omit the index j from the relevant variables. After bearing the entry cost f E and learning his productivity , an F agent approaches an M agent in either the North or the South. In each location, there is an in…nitely elastic supply of such agents all of whom have an outside option normalized to zero. An F agent o¤ers his potential partner a contract that speci…es a …xed payment.
The speci…ed payment from F to M may be positive or negative, and the o¤er is made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The F agent anticipates that, if he accepts the o¤er, his earnings will include the contracted payment plus a fraction of pro…ts. Pro…t sharing results from ex post bargaining once the inputs have been produced. The pro…t shares re ‡ect the organization of the enterprise (see below), which F is free to choose. The F agent sets the contractual payment to provide his partner with an expected net reward of zero. All such o¤ers are accepted.
For now we assume that assembly can be conducted only in the North. An organizational form consists of an ownership structure and a location of M , denoted by fk; lg, where k is either I or O (integration or outsourcing) and l is either N or S (North or South). The …xed cost of maintaining an organizational structure fk; lg is f l k in units of Northern labor. We assume that f l k is separable and write it as f l k = f l + f k . In contrast to Antràs and Helpman (2004), we assume that the …xed organizational cost of integration is less than the …xed cost of outsourcing, i.e., f I < f O . 5 But like Antràs and Helpman, we assume that doing business in the South is more costly than doing business at home; i.e., f N < f S . For simplicity we also assume that f N = f I = 0. Thus
Contracts are incomplete. They specify only the sizes and directions of the …xed payments, leaving the agents to bargain over surplus after the inputs have been produced. We assume Nash bargaining in which F captures a share 2 (0; 1) of the surplus from his relationship with M . The potential revenue is R (i) p (i) x (i) = Dx , which, using (1), can be expressed as
To determine the bargaining outcome, we need to consider the agents' outside options.
The outside option for M always is zero, because m (i) is tailored speci…cally to the product i. Similarly, the outside option for F is zero if the organizational form involves outsourcing.
However, with integration, F enjoys property rights to the inputs produced by M . Since he owns these inputs, he can use them even if his partnership with M dissolves. But we assume that failure to cooperate with M is costly to F ; without M , the entrepreneur can attain only a fraction of the output described by (1) . For simplicity we assume that 2 (0; 1) is the same in the North and the South. Therefore, under integration, F has an outside option of
Given this bargaining framework, the entrepreneur F receives the fraction O of R (i) 
is a variant of our productivity measure and
As 
Organizational Forms
We analyze the organizational choices of …rms that di¤er in their productivity levels. Two complementarities between outsourcing and foreign sourcing are re ‡ected in the equilibrium choices.
Complementarity I
In the discussion of the …rst complementarity, we maintain the assumption that there are no transport costs of intermediate inputs or …nal goods. We also assume-as we do for the remainder of the paper-that production is intensive in the use of intermediate inputs, so that operating pro…ts are declining in k . When this is true, providing better incentives for M is more important to F than is appropriating a larger fraction of the revenue. This consideration 
Complementarity II
We now extend the model to allow for costly transport of intermediate inputs. To make this analysis interesting, we allow F to locate assembly in the South or in the North. But we continue to assume that F controls the assembly activity; i.e., that assembly is integrated with product design. Then the only new option available to F is to conduct FDI in assembly, which entails an extra …xed cost of g S I = g S > 0. This extra cost means that F has no reason to locate assembly in the South unless it is costly to transport intermediate inputs. Thus, the introduction of an FDI option would not matter without the assumption of costly transport.
Transport costs take the "iceberg"form. A …rm must ship > 1 units of the intermediate input from the South in order that one unit arrives in the North. Bargaining takes place after the intermediate inputs have arrived at their destination. Therefore, the e¤ective marginal cost of producing intermediates in the South for delivery in the North is w S . The operating pro…ts for a …rm that assembles …nal goods in country j, produces intermediates in country l, and has an ownership structure k are given by
where
This leaves us with eight potential organizational forms, indexed by fk; l; jg, where k = I
or O, l = N or S, and j = N or S. As before, k represents the ownership structure and l represents the location of M , while the new index j represents the location of assembly.
To economize on the number of cases, we assume that is large, so that separation of production of intermediate inputs and assembly by F never is pro…table. Then F chooses an organizational form from among the remaining alternatives, which are fO; N; N g, fI; N; N g, Finally, we note that a very similar …gure would apply if we were to consider variation in integration strategies as a function of the …xed cost g S , instead of the cost f S . Both parameters re ‡ect the cost of doing business in the South. Given that manufacturing and assembly are always located in the same country due to high transport costs for intermediate inputs, the roles played by the …xed costs associated with these two activities are similar. space is a vertical line. Similarly, the cuto¤ productivity level 
Our assumptions imply I > O , and -since production is intensive in intermediate inputs
O , which in turn implies the inequality in (A1) (recall that w S < 1). As a consequence, ON;OS < IN;IS .
To complete the construction of Figure 1 , note that the cuto¤ productivity between fO; N g and fI; N g is ; which also is a ray through the origin.
Construction of Figure 2 . We follow the same procedure as with Figure 1 . Since now we vary f S , the …xed cost of manufacturing in the South, the boundaries between fO; N; N g and fI; N; N g and between 
